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IN PARI DELICTO: THE CONSUMER'S
BEST FRIEND
I. INTRODUCTION
A substantial amount of the nation's industrial output is dis-
tributed to the consumer through franchised-dealership networks,
such as those utilized in the petroleum and automobile industries.
Many advantages inure to the manufacturer-supplier from the use of
such dealership arrangements, but the essential element is his ability
to control the final distribution of his product. Although the use of
these arrangements is not necessarily anticompetitive, whenever the
manufacturer reaches for final control over the distribution of his
products, illegal restraints on competition may result. The dealer-
franchisee is frequently financially weak when compared to the man-
ufacturer, and is therefore in a poor position to bargain for the terms
of his franchise contract. Provisions of the contract which are viola-
tive of the antitrust laws often go unchallenged. The government
is virtually helpless to effectively police the entire economy and the
consumer usually has too small a financial interest to warrant the
massive undertaking of a private antitrust suit, and the dealer-al-
though he has great familiarity with his franchise and a crucial fi-
nancial interest-has often been denied the use of the courts to assert
his rights under the antitrust laws. Courts have frequently held that,
if the franchise agreement does violate the antitrust laws, the dealer,
because he is a party to it, has himself violated the law and is there-
fore estopped from invoking the aid of the court.1 Although the
ground cited for the dismissal has often been the common-law doc-
trine of in pari delicto,2 the rhetoric of the decisions is confusingly
varied. The effect, however, has always been the same: the dealer is
shunned by the court, the antitrust violation continues, and the
public is exposed to that injury which the antitrust laws were in-
tended to eliminate.
1 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Water and Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Electric Light
and Power Co., 209 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954); Eastman
Kodak v. Blackmore, 277 F. 694 (2d Cir. 1921).
2 Helpful texts on the subject include: Note, In Pari Delicto and Consent as
Defenses in Private Antitrust Suits, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1241 (1965); Note, Unclean Hands:
The Effect of Plaintiff's Antitrust Violations on Antitrust Actions, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1071 (1965); Comment, Limiting the Unclean Hands and In Pari Delicto Defenses in
Anti-trust Suits: An Additional Justification, 54 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 456 (1959). See generally
TnmBnax.AxE, F.DanAL TamLE DA.AGr ANumusr AcriONS (1965).
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In Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corporation3 four
Midas Muffler dealers brought an action against their franchisor
claiming that certain provisions of the franchise contract violated
the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
in pari delicto is not to be recognized as a defense to an antitrust
action, and that these dealers were not barred from asserting their
cause of action on other grounds because allowing recovery would
promote enforcement of the antitrust laws. Critical to this second
holding was the Court's characterization of the nature of the dealer's
conduct in forming and complying with the illegal provisions. The
Court felt that the dealers complied because compliance was the
only way they could receive the benefits offered from operating the
franchised dealerships. It expressly reserved the question of whether
a party who voluntarily participated in the formation of illegal pro-
visions and complied with them would be barred from asserting a
cause of action. The Court's determination that the dealers' com-
pliance was not voluntary is subject to question in that it did not
consider the availability of legal remedies which would have allowed
the dealers to receive the benefits of the franchise contract without
complying with the illegal provisions. Additionally, some complex
questions were raised and left unanswered regarding the amount of
damages the dealers should recover.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE CASE
International Parts (defendant in the district court) had been a
manufacturer of exhaust system parts since 1938. Its products were
marketed in the manner customary for its industry: sales were made
directly, or through wholesalers, to numerous small, usually dingy,
automobile repair garages. The garages sold mufflers, and other ex-
haust system parts, in much the same manner that they sold general
automobile replacement parts and accessories. There was little pro-
duct brand differentiation and almost no consumer advertising by
the manufacturers. In 1955, International introduced a plan which
revolutionized a large segment of the retail exhaust system market.
Through Midas, a wholly owned subsidiary, franchise agreements
were made with dealers who were to operate retail muffler shops.
The shops were to be clean, well appointed, and were to maintain
an environment appealing to the public. The shops were to display
respondent's trade marks of "Midas" and "Midas Mufflers" and its
service mark of "Midas Muffler Shops." Midas was to extensively
3 392 US. 134 (1968).
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advertise its product on a nation-wide basis. It was to emphasize to
the public that it operated a nation-wide chain of shops which were
manned by exhaust system specialists, that the shops sold only Midas
products, that installation would be made free in fifteen minutes on
a "while-you-wait" basis, and that the Midas Muffler was guaranteed
for life and would be replaced free at any Midas Muffler Shop.
The franchise agreement offered to potential dealers provided
for the following: Midas would grant to each dealer an exclusive
territory, would allow the display of its trade and service marks at a
specified location within that territory and in local advertising, and
would underwrite the cost of the muffler guarantee. The dealers
were obligated to carry a full line of Midas products, to resell them
only at the designated location, at prices established by Midas, and
to honor the Midas guarantee. Additionally, the dealers were re-
quired to refrain from dealing with any Midas' competitor and from
selling any other automobile products or accessories at the designated
locations. There was no lease or purchase of equipment from Midas
required, and there was no franchise fee. The franchise was cancel-
lable by either party on thirty-days notice.
The last of the four petitioners had accepted a franchise by
August 1956. Each eagerly sought and acquired additional fran-
chises until in 1959 they operated a total of twenty Midas Shops.
Each petitioner actively assisted Midas in the continuing develop-
ment of the dealership plan. They contributed articles to the "Dealer
Dabber," a monthly house publication, and each was selected to
serve on the National Advisory Council composed of ten of the more
successful dealers. The Council held extensive meetings to discuss
among its members and with respondents ways and means for im-
proving the operation of the muffler shops and for improving and
promoting the Midas image. Respondents credited the Council with
having a significant effect on the evaluation of the Midas Plan.
The Midas Plan proved highly successful. But in spite of the
enormous profits petitioners realized from their operations, a dis-
pute developed between them and respondents over a number of
the contract provisions. Petitioners' objections, as later expressed in
their complaint, included the following: A contract provision which
required them to buy all exhaust system parts from Midas forced
them to pay higher prices for tail pipes and clamps than those avail-
able from Midas' competitors. (Only the muffers actually bore brand
identification and were covered by the guarantee). Also, the peti-
tioners wanted to sell automobile spring and shock absorbers and
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other replacement parts and accessories at their Midas Shop locations.
They claimed the franchise restrictions which prohibited this caused
them to forfeit additional profits. Further, they alleged that Midas
sold Midas branded products to other dealers at lower prices than
it sold to petitioners, and that International marked, under the
International brand, mufflers physically identical to the Midas bran-
ded mufflers but at lower prices than petitioners paid for the Midas
muffler, and that International and Midas refused to sell the Inter-
national brand to the Midas dealers. Additionally, the petitioners
sought more franchises from Midas and claimed that the refusal to
grant more franchises (or to waive the location requirement for
sales and trademark use) caused them to forfeit additional profits.
Midas alleged that the dispute centered primarily over its refusal
to grant petitioners exclusive rights to develop certain market areas.
One petitioner demanded Washington D.C., another sought St.
Louis, and the third had a desire for all of Michigan. Petitioners
claimed that International Parts, Midas, two other wholly owned
subsidiaries, and ten corporate officers had conspired to form and
enforce the alleged illegal provisions.
Respondents continually refused to alter the contract. Three
petitioners then terminated their franchises and the fourth, after
openly violating the provision, acquiesced to cancellation by Midas.
Thereafter petitioners instituted a treble damage action in the
district court claiming the franchise provisions violated section 1
of the Sherman Act,4 and section 3 of the Clayton Act5 (counts one
and two) and that the price discrimination practiced by Midas and
International violated section 2 of the Clayton Act as amended by
the Robinson Patman Act" (count three). They alleged damages
for the time during which they operated the muffler shops and for
profits that would have been earned had Midas granted the new
franchises requested.
The respondents, while denying any violation of the antitrust
laws, asserted as an affirmative defense that petitioners were in pari
delicto7 with them and therefore were barred from asserting their
cause of action. They claimed that petitioners voluntarily entered
into the franchise agreements with full knowledge of their terms,
actively participated in the development of the Midas Plan, and
4 15 US.C. § 1 (1965).
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1965).
6 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1965).
7 Cases dted note 1 supra.
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sought more franchises and exclusive marketing areas. They also
claimed that petitioners ought not be allowed, after reaping enor-
mous profits from their participation, to recover, by way of a treble
damage action, additional profits. Petitioners, in reply, asserted two
theories. First, they argued that the Supreme Court had disallowed
the defense in antitrust actions and second, if the defense did apply
to antitrust actions, it did not apply to their case because their
participation had been coerced by economic necessity., The district
court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment.9 It
held that:
[E]ach plaintiff voluntarily entered into the franchise agreement
at issue and accepted the benefits therefrom. They are... in pari
delicto with defendants, and therefore unable to reap the harvest
of their own misdeeds . ... Under no circumstances could
"coercion" be said to be a factor herein.10
On appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit," petitioners advanced substantially the same argu-
ments. In particular, they emphasized the importance of two rela-
tively recent Supreme Court decisions, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.'2 and Simpson v. Union Oil Co.13 In Kiefer-
Stewart the defendants, Seagram and Calver, were suppliers of li-
8 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927);
Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1964); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,
327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Unions,
274 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960); Ring v. Spina 148 F.2d 647
(2d Cir. 1945).
9 Perma Life Mufilers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 1966 Trade Cas.
71,801 (N.D. Inl. 1966) (Counts one and two). As an alternative ground for granting
respondents' motion for summary judgment, the district court held that because the
corporations were family owned, and operated as a single unit, they could not have
conspired within the meaning of the Sherman Act. The court of appeals affirmed this
holding, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th
Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Midas and International Parts
had conspired; that a combination had existed between Midas and each of the peti-
tioners as of the time he unwillingly complied with the restrictive provisions, and
between Midas and its other dealers whose compliance was obtained by threats of
termination.
The district court also granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on
count three (price discrimination), Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,802. The court of appeals reversed this holding and
the issue was not carried to the Supreme Court.
10 1966 Trade Cas. at 82,705-06.
11 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967).
12 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
13 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
quor to the wholesale market. Kiefer-Stewart, a wholesaler, alleged
that after the OPA retail price restrictions were removed, defendants
conspired to fix the maximum resale price of their products at the
previous OPA levels. Kiefer-Stewart refused to observe Seagram's
price policy and both Seagram and Calvert refused to supply it. It
then brought a treble damage action in defense of which Seagram
alleged that plaintiff had conspired with other wholesalers to fix a
higher resale price for defendants' products. Because plaintiff had
committed an antitrust violation similar to that violation charged
against defendants, it was barred from recovery. The Supreme Court
in rejecting defendant's argument held:
[I]f petitioner [Kiefer-Stewart] and others were guilty of infrac-
tions of the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in
appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Govern-
ment or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct
of petitioner, however, could not legalize the unlawful combina-
tion by respondents nor immunize them against liability to those
they injured. ... .14
Petitioners in Perma Life claimed that this case clearly shows the
Supreme Court's policy that common-law doctrines which deny an
injured party a remedy because of his illegal conduct ought not bar
an antitrust action.
In Simpson the plaintiff was an operator of one of defendant
Union Oil's gasoline service stations. The premises were leased on a
yearly, renewable basis. Concomitant to the lease, Simpson and
Union entered into a consignment contract that provided, inter alia,
that gasoline consigned to Simpson would be retailed at prices speci-
fied by Union. The consignment contract, by its terms, terminated
at the expiration of the lease. When Simpson found himself losing
business to price-warring competitors, he objected to the resale
price provision and insisted that Union remove it from the contract.
Union refused and Simpson eventually stopped complying with the
provision. When his lease was not renewed he brought a treble dam-
age action claiming damages for the profits lost as a result of com-
plying with the alleged illegal provision and for termination of his
lease. Union denied the alleged antitrust violations and argued that
even if a violation were assumed, Simpson suffered no compensable
damage. He had voluntarily accepted the lease-consignment agree-
ment with full knowledge of its terms. He should not be allowed to
recover damages caused by his own act. The district court granted
14 340 US. at 10.
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Union's motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.15 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that Simpson alleged compensatory damages.
The fact that a retailer can refuse to deal does not give the sup-
plier immunity if the arrangement is one of those schemes con-
demned by the antitrust laws.
... If that were a defense [that dealers need not agree to the
contracts], a supplier could regiment thousands of otherwise
competitive dealers in resale price maintenance programs merely
by fear of non-renewal of short-term leases. 16
Petitioners in Perma Life argued that they were in substantially the
same position as Simpson was; that that case necessarly eliminated in
pari delicto as a defense to an antitrust action and it should be con-
trolling as to their case. In the alternative they argued that even if
Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson were not dispositive of the in pari de-
licto defense in antitrust actions, their acceptance of and participa-
tion in the Midas Plan was obtained by economic coercion and thus
would not support the in pari delicto defense.' 7 Acceptance of the
plan, they argued, was a necessary condition of doing business with
Midas and the only way they could avail themselves of the profits
realizable from operating a specialized exhaust system shop. The
court of appeals, however, distinguished both Kiefer-Stewart and
Simpson. The former case, the court held, only applied to the fact-
ual situation there involved; that is, when the plaintiff's violation
was independent of the defendant's violation. Here, the petitioners
were parties to the contract which they alleged was in violation of
the antitrust laws. In Simpson the Supreme Court did not mention
in pari delicto and it did not intend its decision to affect it as a de-
fense. Further, the court stated:
It appears that the hard core basis for the Court's decision
resides in the fact that Union Oil was in a position by means of
a lease to coerce Simpson to sell at prices fixed by Union
Oil.... When Simpson refused to comply with the terms of the
consignment agreement, Union Oil cancelled his lease. By this
action Simpson was deprived not only of the right to purchase
from Union Oil but simultaneously of a place to do busi-
ness .... 18
15 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
10 377 U.S. at 16-17.
17 Cases cited note 8 supra.
18 376 F.2d at 697.
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The court of appeals went on to state, regarding petitioners' parti-
cipation in the Midas Plan:
Without restating the facts of the instant cases, it is sufficient to
note that they are a far cry from those considered by the Supreme
Court in Simpson.19
III. COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
The above decisions reveal substantial confusion regarding the
definition and application of the in pari delicto defense and two
other related common-law defenses which, if applicable, bar a plain-
tiff from asserting his cause of action because some violation of the
law or unconscionable conduct has made him unfit to invoke the aid
of the court. A clarification of the factual distinctions on which the
different defenses rely seems necessary for a full understanding of
the Perma Life decision.20
The most comprehensive of the common law defenses is that of
"unclean hands". Its application bars a plaintiff's cause of action
because of his conduct with regard to the matter in litigation. He
need not have been a party to the defendant's violation. It is enough
that his violation or inequitable conduct is related to the litigation.21
For example, a plaintiff who would attempt to enforce an uncon-
scionably harsh contract,22 or to effect a forfeiture which would have
been avoided but for his lack of good faith in dealing with the other
party,23 or to offer perjured testimony,24 or to use the power of the
court for some other improper motive, such as harassing the defen-
dant,26 may be barred from the court.
In pari delicto has been considered by some courts to be but a
corollary of the unclean hands doctrine.2 6 Generally it applies only
when the plaintiff and defendant are in privity as to a violation of
10 Id. at 698.
20 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138, 153
(1968).
21 Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 US. 240 (1933).
22 Newton v. Illinois Oil Co., 316 Ill. 416, 147 N.E. 465 (1925).
23 Rock v. Mathews, 35 W. Va. 531, 14 S.E. 137 (1891). See also Dunscombe v.
Amfort Oil Co., 201 Ky. 290, 256 S.W. 427 (1923).
24 Donnell v. Howell, 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
25 Peltzer v. Gilbert, 260 Mo. 500, 169 S.W. 257 (1914); Cook v. Cupman, 30 N.J.
Eq. 114 (1927).
26 Morrissey v. Bologna, 240 Miss. 284, 123 So. 2d 537 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
212 (1961).
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the law2T -e.g., when they are parties to an illegal contract or con-
spiracy. The doctrine would, accordingly, bar an action brought by
one thief to recover a distribution of the loot from his accomplice.2
The rationale of the doctrine, as in the unclean hands doctrine, is
to prevent the court from being used as a tool of the wrongdoer.
A third situation occurs where the plaintiff is found to have, by
his conduct, consented to the defendant's violation. Recovery is de-
nied to the plaintiff on one of two theories. Some courts consider
that a plaintiff who has consented to the defendant's action has suf-
fered no compensable injury. He has, in effect, no cause of action.20,
Other courts reason that a plaintiff who has consented to the defen-
dant's conduct and voluntarily put himself in a position to become
a litigant ought not to be allowed to profit by a court imposed dam-
age award. Here the plaintiff is considered barred from asserting his
cause of action. 0
It should be noted that these three defenses, unclean hands, in
pari delicto, and consent, often overlap. When the parties are in
pari delicto, for example, they certainly have unclean hands and
each can be said to have consented to the other's violation. Addition-
ally, the questions of when a plaintiff's violation is closely enough
related to the litigation to bar him under the doctrine of unclean
hands, and whether the plaintiff participated in the same venture
with the defendant so as to bar him under the doctrine of in pari
delicto, appear to be but matters of degree. A further point adding
to the confusion of these defenses is that courts often mismatch the
name of the defense with the factual situation before them. In par-
ticular, the term in pari delicto is frequently used in a broad sense
to apply to all three defenses. 31
These defenses ought not be confused with what is generally
termed the affirmative defense of illegality. Here the defense is as-
serted against the plaintiff's cause of action, not as a bar to its asser-
tion. With the exception of one early precedent to the contrary,32 it
is generally held that a plaintiff's antitrust violation is not a defense
27 Rock v. Mathews, 35 W. Va. 531, 14 S.E. 137 (1891).
28 Boylston Bottling Co. v. O'Neill, 231 Mass. 498, 121 N.E. 411 (1919); Woodson
v. Hopkins, 85 Miss. 171, 37 So. 1000 (1905).
29 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, 232-37 (1965); PRossmE, ToRTs, 33-34, 102-04 (3d ed.
1964).
30 Id.
81 See note 20 supra.
82 Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co., 212 US. 227 (1909).
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to a cause of action not based on the antitrust laws.38 For example,
in Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,3 4 Bruce's had defaulted
on a note made to American as payment for the purchase price of
cans. In an action brought by American to recover on the note,
Bruce's asserted lack of consideration as a defense. The claim was
based on an allegation that American had violated the antitrust laws
by price discrimination on the purchased cans and that such viola-
tion voided the consideration. The defense was denied, substantially
on the ground that there was no direct relationship between the
amount of damages Bruce's sustained as a result of the alleged price
discrimination and the amount of the obligation it was seeking to
avoid.
The Kiefer-Stewart case presents a factual situation applicable
to the unclean hands defense. The Supreme Court made no attempt
to identify which common law defense was involved or to limit its
holding to the factual situation of the case. In fact, a number of fed-
eral courts initially interpreted the case as eliminating all forms of
the defense.33 In Simpson the parties argued the case on a consent
basis36 and the district court 37 and court of appeals3" seemed to base
their holdings on that principle. The Supreme Court did not discuss
or identify the particular defense involved. Mr. Justice Harlan, how-
ever, pointed out in his opinion in Perma Life3 9 (concurring in part
and dissenting in part) that Simpson could be considered either a
consent case, if acceptance of the illegal contract constituted a vio-
lation, or an in pari delicto case if only the compliance with the il-
legal provisions was a violation.
All three factual situations were present in the Perma Life case.
It was alleged that petitioners voluntarily accepted the franchises.
This seemingly would create a question of whether they consented
to respondents' violations. Secondly, it was alleged that petitioners
33 See, e.g., Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
34 380 U.S. 743 (1947), aff'g 155 Fla. 877, 22 So. 2d 461 (1947).
35 Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Franchon
& Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 84 (S.D. Cal. 1951), af'd 215 F.2d
167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.. 912 (1955).
36 See Brief for Petitioners and Respondents, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Segram 9- Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
37 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 1961 Trade Cas., Para. 69, 936 (N.D. Cal. 1960).
38 Simpson v. Union Oi Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
39 392 U.S. at 155.
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actively participated in the development, or evolution of the Midas
Plan. On this point in pari delicto could be said to apply since the
allegation was that they participated with respondents in the illegal
combination or conspiracy. Further, it was alleged that petitioners
each sought to obtain a monopoly over a large distribution area.
Since petitioners claimed that respondents would not grant the mon-
opoly there is no basis to support a claim of conspiracy between
petitioners and respondents on this issue. Petitioners' efforts at mon-
opolization would apply only to the defense of unclean hands.
The district court and the court of appeals, however, considered
these three allegations together in concluding they supported the
in pari delicto defense. Additionally, these two courts used the com-
bined effect of the three allegations to support their finding that the
petitioners voluntarily accepted and participated in the Midas Plan.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT
On certiorari the Supreme Court characterized petitioners' par-
ticipation in the Midas Plan with greater clarity. First, the Court
noted that the mere voluntary acceptance of the franchise would not
bar their recovery. Simpson was cited as controlling on this point.
Second, and of much significance, the Court stated that although it
may be found that petitioners did participate voluntarily with re-
spect to some aspects of the franchise plan, they could not be charged
with being participants as to the creation of the whole of the plan.
This the Court concluded from Midas' unwavering retention of
certain provisions objected to by petitioners and the over-all "take
it or leave it" basis of the franchise system. The Court noted that
although petitioners sought the franchise actively, they did not seek
each and every provision. Petitioners' participation as to the whole
of the franchise plan could not be said to have been voluntary in
any "meaningful sense of the word. " 40 Although the Court pointed
out that the involuntary nature of petitioners' acceptance of and
participation in the overall plan was enough to deny application of
the doctrine of in pari delicto if it applied to antitrust actions, it
went further and held that
[T]he doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, con-
tents, and effects, is not to be recognized as a defense to an and-
trust action.41
40 Id. at 139.
41 Id. at 140.
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The use of the term "complex scope, contents, and effects" with
respect to in pari delicto seem most assuredly to mean that the Court
intended to refer not only to in pari delicto in its narrow sense but
also meant to include the related doctrines of consent and unclean
hands. It seems to be a safe conclusion that attempts to distinguish
future cases from Perma Life on the basis of technical distinctions
of common-law doctrines will be futile. This conclusion is entirely
consistent with the Court's expressed policy regarding the application
of common-law barriers to antitrust actions.
At common law the doctrine of in pari delicto was imposed to
preserve the integrity of the court by preventing it from being used
as a tool by wrongdoers seeking to promote and profit from their
own wrongs, and by allowing it to avoid a tainting association with
the corrupt. However, in Perma Life Mr. Justice Black stressed a
contravening policy:
We have often indicated the inappropriatenese of invoking
broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves
important public purposes.42
He noted that Congress had, by providing the treble damage remedy,
expressed the intention that the public is best protected from anti-
competitive combinations by having the antitrust laws enforced,
and that the Sherman Act makes no provision for the defense of in
pari delicto. Allowing a plaintiff's moral reprehensibility, or his in-
cidental windfall gain, to bar his action would undermine the use-
fulness of the treble damage remedy as a deterrent to antitrust vio-
lations. 43 In fact, the Court granted certiorari because:
[Tehese rulings of the Court of Appeals seemed to threaten the
effectiveness of the private action as a vital means for enforcing
the antitrust policy of the United States.... 44
It should, however, be remembered that the Court character-
ized this case as being one where the petitioners participated as to
some aspects of the illegal scheme, but did not participate voluntarily
in the whole of the arrangement. The Court expressly reserved the
question of whether a party who truly participated in the promul-
gation and support of the illegal agreement as a whole would be
barred from asserting his antitrust action on a basis wholly apart
from in pari delicto.45
42 Id. at 138.
43 Id. at 139.
44 Id. at 156.
45 Id. at 140.
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In separate opinions Justices Fortas, Marshall and Harlan, joined
by Stewart, expressed the belief that the doctrine of in pari delicto,
although not applicable to this case because of the involuntary na-
ture of petitioners' participation, should be applied to situations of
fully equal participation. They emphasized that it would be incon-
sistent with public policy to allow such a plaintiff to reap the profits
of a treble damage award. Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
Even if the threat of intra-conspiracy treble damages had some
deterrent effect, however, I should not think it a too 'fastidious
regard for the relative moral worth of the parties' ... to decline
to sanction a kind of antitrust enforcement that rests upon a
principle of well-compensated dishonor among thieves. 46
Mr. Justice White concurred in the Court's opinion and added
that he thought the matter was best considered as one of causation.
Since the petitioners here did not voluntarily participate as to the
whole of the plan, they could not be said to have been a substantial
cause of their injury. But, if they were equally responsible, they
should be denied recovery because they would then be a substantial
factor in the cause of their own injury.
The Court, after dismissing the doctrine of in pari delicto as a
defense to an antitrust action went on to state that:
[O]nce it is shown that the plaintiff did not aggressively support
and further the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and
parcel of it, his understandable attempts to make the best of a
bad situation should not be a ground for completely denying
him the right to recover which the antitrust acts give him4 7
Thus the Court apparently concluded that *allowing a plaintiff in
the position of petitioners to recover would promote enforcement of
the antitrust laws by enlisting a significant number of "private at-
torneys general."
V. VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION?
The Court's conclusions that petitioners complied with the il-
legal provisions of the franchise as a necessary condition for doing
business and that their limited participation in the development
of the Midas Plan was only an attempt to make the best of an arrange-
ment over which they had little control, seems to be subject to ques-
tion. Petitioners operated Midas Shops for about four years. They
were not financially anemic; to the contrary, they rapidly expanded
46 Id. at 154.
47 Id. at 140.
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the number of shops which they operated and they realized very
substantial profits. Their combined sales for the four years of par-
ticipation in the plan exceeded four and one half million dollars.
This amount was more than twenty-five percent of Midas' sales. 48 It
was not until they left the Midas Plan and accepted franchises from
a Midas competitor that they turned their attention to the courts.
During their four years of compliance, the public was exposed to
the injury inherent in antitrust violation. The Court felt that peti-
tioners' long-term compliance should not bar their action because it
was the only way that they could receive the benefits-the profits-
which the franchise plan offered. If these petitioners had not accepted
the plan, others would have.
The question is whether the law provides a means whereby
petitioners could have enjoyed the profits offered by the Midas Plan
without forcing them to comply with those provisions which were
violative of the antitrust laws. A party who accepts a franchise and
complies with its conditions when the law offers him an alternative
does so voluntarily. Although the law is not yet certain, there is
strong support for the proposition that a franchise dealer can have
injunctive relief49 against enforcement of the illegal provisions and
against a retaliatory cancellation of his franchise. Even if injunctive
relief is not available, a dealer may recover damages for the cancel-
lation of his contract if such cancellation is used as a means of en-
forcing illegal contract provisions.8
An acute problem which often faces a dealer who would litigate
his franchise contract is that the franchisor might retaliate against
the commencement of the action by terminating the dealership.
If the dealer cannot be protected against a retaliatory cancellation
he can often be expected to shy away from a law suit. This is par-
ticularly true for a long-established dealer. Even if damages for can-
cellation are available, he may well decide to live with the franchise
contract rather than lose his business. Because it is difficult to make
abstract conclusions as to when injunctions will issue, and because
48 Brief for Respondents at 13, Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp.
392 US. 134 (1968).
49 As a general rule the doctrines of in pari delicto and unclean hands have not
been applied in antitrust actions for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Gray Line, Inc. v.
Gray Line Sightseeing Cos. Assoc., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1965); United
Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
But see Graham v. Triangle Pub., Inc. 23 F. Supp. 825, aff'd. 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.
1965).
50 See notes 64 and 73 infra.
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the law with respect to the availability of injunctive protection
against franchise cancellation is undergoing rapid and substantial
evolution, the applicable precedent should be noted.
Section 16 of the Clayton Act51 is the primary source of federal
court authority to enjoin antitrust violations in private actions. This
section provides both for the issuance of permanent injunctions and
for the issuance of preliminary injunctions when a danger of irrep-
arable loss or damage is shown to be immediate. Courts generally
agree that, regardless of how ascertainable damages might be, the
irreparable loss or damage requirement is satisfied if obliteration of
a business is threatened. 52
Much of the litigation on this injunctive issue has centered on
the question of whether the threatened cancellation of the contract
is, in itself, an antitrust violation within the scope of section 16.
Many early decisions held that it was not. They considered the can-
cellation to be a contract right which was unaffected by an anti-
trust violation. These decisions have emphasized two theories. First,
they rely on the principal that courts cannot make or alter the par-
ties' contract.53 Secondly, the decisions have often held that the
Colgate54 doctrine, that businessmen have a basic freedom to select
those with whom they will conduct business and are free to refuse
to deal with any party, is controlling. The cancellation is just a means
used to express the right to refuse to deal and, therefore, is not an
antitrust violation. 5 However, two of the circuit courts of appeal 6
have held that even assuming cancellation is not in itself an antitrust
violation, the federal courts have general equity power, notwith-
standing section 16, to enjoin use of an otherwise valid short-term
cancellation clause when it is used to frustrate antitrust litigation.
51 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1965).
52 Maclntyre, Antitrust Injunctions: A Flexible Private Remedy, 1966 DurE L.J.
22, 28.
53 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 162 F. Supp. 746 (NJD. Cal. 1958); Ball v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 505 (W.D. Pa. 1944). See generally, Gellhorn,Limitation on
Contract Termination Rights-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DuKE LJ. 465.
54 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 500 (1919).
55 House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1962); cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 590 U.S. 145
(March 4, 1968); Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
See also Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When does Single-Firm Conduct Become
Vertical Restraint?, 80 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROD. 590 (1965).
56 Bergen Drug Co., Inc. v. Park, Davis & Co., 807 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); House
of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962). Cf. Dart Drug
Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 344 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Another theory for granting injunctive relief was expressed in
Bateman v. Ford Motor Co.57 Dealer Bateman brought an action in
the district court alleging violation of the Dealers Day in Court Act.53
He sought damages, a permanent injunction, and a preliminary in-
junction against cancellation of his dealership. The district court
refused to issue the preliminary injunction on the grounds that the
Act itself did not provide for injunctive relief and it was not an
antitrust law so section 16 of the Clayton Act was not a source of
authority for an injunction. The court of appeals reversed, noting
that:
To make the remedy provided by the statute effective in ac-
complishing what is meant to be accomplished, we think that
the dealer needs equity help in keeping his business going while
his legal claim is being tested. A judgment for damages acquired
years after his franchise has been taken away and his business
obliterated is small consolation to one who, as here, has had a
Ford franchise since 1933.59
It seems to be a reasonable conclusion that the treble damage remedy
provided for violations as those alleged in Perma Life would also
be made more effective by giving the dealer protection from retalia-
tory cancellation.
In another automobile franchise dealer case, Englander Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,60 the dealer claimed damages resulting from
the forced sale of his business. He claimed that Ford used the short-
term cancellation provision in an attempt to force him to comply
with illegal provisions in the franchise and later to force him to sell
his business to a Ford designee at an unfair price. The court held
that the use of an otherwise valid short-term cancellation provision
to effect an antitrust violation is, in itself, an antitrust violation.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned the theory expressed in
Englander. In Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,)1 plain-
tiff Poller owned and operated a UHF television broadcasting sta-
tion in Milwaukee. The station, WCAN, was affiliated by contract
with CBS. CBS purchased a competing Milwaukee UHF station,
then cancelled WCAN's affiliation under a six-month cancellation
provision, and later purchased WCAN for what plaintiff alleged to
57 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962).
05 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1965).
59 502 F.2d at 66.
00 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
61 368 US. 464 (1962).
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be a distressed price resulting from WCAN's loss of network affilia-
tion. Poller alleged that the cancellation provision was used to fur-
ther defendants' conspiracy in restraint of trade and to create a
monopoly. The district court granted defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the cancellation was merely the
exercise of a legal right of a producer to select the outlets for its
products. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that:
[I]f such a cancellation and purchase were part and parcel of
unlawful conduct or agreement with others or were conceived
in a purpose to unreasonably restrain trade, control a market,
or monopolize, then such conduct might well run afoul of the
Sherman Law. 2
In sum, there are three theories on which injunctive relief can
be granted. The federal courts have general equity power to restrain
cancellation when it is being used as a means to frustrate litigation.
The courts have general equity powers to issue preliminary injunc-
tions to make more effective an existing remedy. Finally, the act of
cancellation can be an antitrust violation, in which case section 16
provides direct statutory authority.
These cases indicate the broad areas on which preliminary in-
junctive relief can be-and has been-granted. The cases are rela-
tively recent and the law on the subject is not clearly defined nor
without contradiction. 3 The bulk of the attention that the Supreme
Court has given to the injunctive issue has been in government cases
where only a permanent injunction was involved. Here the protec-
tion of a vendee from retaliation by the defendant vendor is not
directly at issue.64 The temporary injunction question is by its very
nature one that often becomes moot before reaching the appellate
courts.65 A more significant limitation on the amount of litigation
62 868 US. at 468-9. Compare Poller and Englander with Osborn v. Sinclair Re-
fining Co., 824 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963) (discussed in text to note 69 infra) and Simpson
(discussed in text to note 13 supra and note 70 infra). In the former cases the courts
stressed that the defendants were using the cancellation clause to "take over" the
dealers' business. In the latter cases the service stations reverted to the oil companies,
but the courts emphasized only that the cancellation clauses were used to coerce the
dealers into compliance with the franchise provisions. Cf., Silver v. New York Stk. Exch.,
878 U.S. 841 (1963). See, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 559 U.S. 207 (1959).
63 See, e.g., House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1962); Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Prod, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. N.Y. 19683);
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 162 F. Supp. 746 (NJ). Cal. 1958); Ball v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 505 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
64 But see Dart Drug Corp. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 844 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
65 But see Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1962) (Discussed in
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has no doubt been the application of the in pari delicto defense.66
Most actions by dealers have been commenced after the franchise
was terminated.
The injunctive remedy does offer the potential, if not the actual,
means by which a dealer in the position of petitioners in Perma Life
can have the benefit of operating under the contract and still avoid
long-term compliance with anti-competitive provisions. Inconsistency
in the lower federal courts is not a matter of much importance in
Supreme Court review. None of the five separate opinions in Perma
Life considered the issue.67
In addition, there is substantial precedent to support the prop-
osition that a dealer who refused to comply with illegal contract
conditions and was cancelled as a result can recover damages result-
ing from the cancellation. The Poller68 case indicates that the Court
will allow damages when cancellation was used as part and parcel
of an illegal conspiracy. The case of Osborn v. Sinclair Refining
Company69 is directly in point.
Simpson7° offers additional support for this proposition. Simpson
sought damages from both forced compliance with illegal provisions
and for cancellation of his lease. The Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss or decide which source of damages was recoverable, but held
only that Simpson suffered compensable damages. It would seem in-
consistent to allow recovery for injuries suffered as a result of the
threatened use of a short-term cancellation clause and deny damages
resulting from the actual use of the clause.
These cases have been noted to show that the dealer, in a position
similar to that of petitioners in Perma Life, has an alternative to
long-term compliance with those franchise provisions which he feels
violate the antitrust laws. When these other remedies are assumed
text to note 57 supra.) (Bateman's franchise had been terminated by the time the case
was heard by the court of appeals. The court, however, ordered that his dealership be
re-established pending litigation).
C6 In pari delicto generally has not barred antitrust actions for injunctions, see
note 49 supra. But, since the dealers generally had no cause of action for injury suffered
during the time in which they complied with the franchise terms, they would not
commence an action for which they needed protection from retaliatory cancellation.
67 Most of the authority for injunctive relief came after petitioners' participation
in the Midas Plan. As a practical matter, no such relief may have been available to
them. This point may serve as a basis for distinguishing Perma Life from future cases.
68 568 US. 464 (1962).
69 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963). Accord, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 527 F.2d 459
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 US. 993 (1964).
70 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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to be available, the Court's conclusion that petitioners acted invol-
untarily is not completely tenable.
VI. WILL PERmA LIFE Am ENFORCEMENT?
The effect of the Perma Life case is to give the dealer a choice
of conduct. He may either bring his action as soon as the objection-
able provisions come into effect, or he may continue to operate his
dealership under the alleged illegal contract. According to the Per-
ma Life decision, he would be suffering "damages" during this time
as a result of his complying with illegal provisions. These damages
would continue to accrue during the four year period imposed by
the statute of limitations.71 After four years of operation some of
the accumulated damages would become unrecoverable as they fall
beyond the period of the statute.72 New damages would, of course,
accumulate to replace those falling beyond the four year period of
limitations. If the dealer's business is increasing, as was the case for
petitioners, the amount of damages would continue to increase as
long as they postponed commencing an action. The dealer's alter-
native to postponing his action would be to bring a suit relatively
soon after the illegal provisions came into effect (or by changes in
the law became illegal), to have enforcement of the illegal provisions
enjoined, and to recover treble damages for the relatively short per-
iod during which he had no reasonable alternative but to comply
with the conditions.
The decision in Perma Life will probably discourage prompt
prosecution of private suits. By delaying the action for five, ten or
fifteen years, a dealer can build up his business and thus the damages
he will recover from the illegal restrictive covenant in his franchise.
The damages will be trebled. If the dealer should decide to bring
suit immediately to enjoin enforcement of the illegal provisions,
his damages will be slight. His only meaningful alternative, then,
is to wait for years until his damages are compounded. In the mean-
time the public must suffer.
Some might argue that Perma Life does have some deterrent
effect because the franchisor will now find it economically unsound
to include the illegal clauses in his franchises. This is not necessarily
true. For a deterrent to be effective at all, the franchisor must know
that the arrangement violates the antitrust laws, or at least he must
71 15 US.C. 15(b) (1965).
72 Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 170 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1948).
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have some reason to suspect that it does.73 In this writer's estimation,
most franchisors do not intentionally and knowingly place illegal
clauses in their contracts.
Assuming that we are dealing with a franchisor who is fully
aware of the illegality of a given contract clause, Perma Life will al-
low him an avenue for escape. As will be noted in more detail later,
the court suggested a unique method for determining the dealer's
damages. The district court must total the harm done to the dealers
by all of the illegal provisions, and then it must subtract the total
benefit that the dealers obtained from the illegal provisions. The
net result is the measure of damages. A franchisor who feels the
need to place an illegal and detrimental (to the dealer) clause in
the franchise will find it relatively easy to reduce his potential
liability. He need merely place an offsetting, illegal and beneficial
(to the dealer) clause in the contractl
If by some chance the franchisor is hesitant about- placing an
illegal clause in the contract, it is certain that the franchisee will
do little to discourage him. The franchisee stands to reap a tre-
mendous windfall gain should the clause be inserted.
VII. DAMAGES
The Court established that petitioners had a cause of action
and were not barred from asserting it. It is not clear what damages
the petitioners stand to recover.
First, it is obvious that the contract as a whole will not be
considered. If it were, petitioners would have suffered no damages
since they received enormous profits from their operations. Only
the illegal provisions will be considered.
It is equally clear that the petitioners will be charged with
any benefit that they received from those illegal provisions that
were forced upon them. It may shock one's sense of justice to learn
that a franchisor can now mitigate his liability on an illegal clause
by simply placing an equally repugnant but profitable (to the
dealer) clause in the contract, but he cannot mitigate his liability
with a clause that is legal and beneficial. However, this is the clear
implication of the Court's words:
73 See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 270 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal.), petition for writ
of prohibition denied, 385 U.S. 806 (1967) (Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 US. 13
(1964). On remand damages were denied on the ground that allowing recovery would
be inequitable because Union's reliance on precedent that its consignment agreements
were not in violation of the antitrust laws was reasonable).
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[Tahe possible beneficial by-product of a restriction from a
plaintiff's point of view can of course be taken into considera-
tion in computing damages .... 74
There is a third aspect of the damage issue. As the Court
noted, petitioners could be found to have participated voluntarily
as to the formation of some provisions of the plan. Hence, there
are two categories of illegal provisions: those which were forced
on the petitioners and those in the formation of which petitioners
voluntarily participated. It is not at all clear from the opinions
whether the Court will consider the effects of both types of pro-
visions in determining damages. Arguments can be made for either
position.
The situation could arise where petitioners suffer a net loss
from the provisions forced on them and a net gain from the volun-
tarily accepted provisions. The question would then be whether
the gain on the "voluntary provisions" should be deductible from
the loss on the "involuntary provisions." Or, if petitioners suffered
a loss on the "voluntary provisions," should that loss be added to
the loss suffered on the "involuntary provisions"? It could be ar-
gued that the "voluntary provisions" should not be considered at
all because, in essence, they arise from a separate cause. That is, the
basis of the petitioners' action is that they were injured by illegal
provisions forced on them by respondents. What arrangements the
two parties may have made on a voluntary basis should have no di-
rect bearing on the damages sustained from the coerced provisions.
However, their participation did advance the illegal scheme and
an attempted separation from it would seem most untenable. It is
restraints of trade, not coercion, that the antitrust laws prohibit.
Further, it could be argued that petitioners' participation was
merely an attempt to mitigate the harmful effects of those pro-
visions forced on them by respondents. Any gain they realized on
the illegal "voluntary provisions" should be deducted from the loss
they suffered on the illegal "involuntary provisions," and any loss
they suffered on the "voluntary provisions" should be added to
the loss suffered on the "involuntary provisions." This would be
because the petitioners should not be held accountable for any harm
they suffered in a reasonable attempt to mitigate the effects of the
provisions forced on them by respondents. This theory seems to
give too little effect to the voluntary nature of their participation.
74 392 U.S. at 140.
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If their participation was voluntary, they need not have violated
the law to mitigate their damages.
If the Court were to hold that parties to a conspiracy could
recover regardless of their participation, then any loss that peti-
tioners realized on the "voluntary provisions" would be recoverable
notwithstanding the injury from the "involuntary provisions." Of
course, if petitioners realized a gain on the voluntary provisions,
respondents, by separate action or cross claim, would theoretically
be able to recover it. On the other hand, if the Court were to dis-
allow the assertion of a cause of action where the parties were vol-
untary participants as to the whole of the scheme, then it could be
argued that it would be inconsistent to charge either party with
profit or loss resulting from the voluntary provisions since no action
would be sustained based on them alone.
The practical problems involved in trying to assess the amount
of benefit or damage resulting from each of the illegal provisions
would, of course, be great. If damages are assessed by computing
the net effect of all the illegal provisions, taken as a whole, the
complexities involved in determining damages would be reduced
since the trial court would not have to isolate the effect of each
provision. The court may be able, for example, to ascertain dam-
ages by comparing the profits earned by plaintiff with the profits
earned by businesses similar to that of the plaintiff's business but
which operated without antitrust violations. The theory of allow-
ing damages for the total injury suffered by one participant to an
illegal endeavor is not without common-law support. For example,
the majority of courts will allow a participant in an illegal prize
fight to recover from his opponent.76 Further, the court has inter-
preted the congressional intent behind the treble damage action as
being to base the penalty for violations on the amount of injury to
property or business resulting from the antitrust violations.76 The
net injury to the plaintiff's business could be said to be the amount
on which the "treble damage penalty" should be based.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion it should be stressed that the Court's
decision in Perma Life involved two distinct holdings. First, the
Court held that the common-law defense of in pari delicto (and
75 Hart v. Geysel, 159 Wash. 632, 294 P. 570 (1930) (dissenting opinion); cf.
Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal. 2d 564, 204 P.2d 1 (1949).
76 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
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the related defenses of unclean hands and consent) are not to be
recognized in antitrust actions. Second, the Court allowed the
dealers to assert their cause of action on the ground that allowing
recovery would promote enforcement of the antitrust laws. It has
been noted that the Court expressly limited the scope of its second
holding to situations where the plaintiff did not voluntarily partici-
pate in the furtherance of the whole illegal arrangement. The
Court concluded that the petitioners' participation in the arrange-
ment was not voluntary as it was the only way they could obtain
the benefits of the dealership. The present state of the law regard-
ing the availability of injunctive protection against cancellation of
the franchise contract and of damages if cancellation does occur has
been noted at some length to show that dealers in the situation of
petitioners most probably have an alternative to long-term compli-
ance with illegal franchise provisions. In light of the fact that the
Court omitted to consider the availability of these alternative rem-
edies the integrity of its conclusion that the petitioners' participa-
tion was involuntary is questionable. A priori, it is not likely that
allowing a plaintiff in the position of the petitioners to recover
damages suffered during long-term compliance with illegal provi-
sions will promote enforcement of the antitrust laws. Additionally,
it has been pointed out that a substantial and complex question has
yet to be resolved regarding the amount of damages a plaintiff to
an intra-conspiracy antitrust action can recover.
Robert G. Martinell
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